Material practice - Revision history

Juju: /* material practice */

2022-04-18T16:07:20Z

material practice

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	Examples in this book of the reciprocal entanglement of concept and matter are Femke Snelting’s project at the Bidston Observatory in Liverpool (see Snelting on <mark class="c1">embeddednes</mark>); Thalia Hoffman’s performance ''To Serve You'' (in <mark class="c6">feeding</mark>); <br>		Examples in this book of the reciprocal entanglement of concept and matter are Femke Snelting’s project at the Bidston Observatory in Liverpool (see Snelting on <mark class="c1">embeddednes</mark>); Thalia Hoffman’s performance ''To Serve You'' (in <mark class="c6">feeding</mark>); <br>
	or Kate Rich on <mark class="c4">business</mark> (~~in fact,~~ this book contains many more examples).		or Kate Rich on <mark class="c4">business</mark> (this book contains many more examples).

Hd-onions at 09:10, 12 April 2022

2022-04-12T09:10:17Z

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	<span class="author">Janneke Wesseling</span>		<span class="author">Janneke Wesseling</span>

	Over the past decades, a re-evaluation or even rehabilitation of practice in relation to theory can be witnessed in the field of the humanities. New Materialist modes of thinking are largely accountable for this change in perspective on the role of practice in academic research. In the humanities, ‘practice’ has long been, and often still is, regarded as subordinate and subservient to theory. Many scholars look down on practice as being merely the handwork in the laboratory that is needed to support or provide proof of theory. The truly important work is of a theoretical nature, that is, the work of the mind. The hegemony of theory largely explains the struggle of art academies in Europe to gain recognition for <mark class="c5">artistic research</mark> by universities (see <mark class="c5">artistic research</mark>).		<div class="no-indent">Over the past decades, a re-evaluation or even rehabilitation of practice in relation to theory can be witnessed in the field of the humanities. New Materialist modes of thinking are largely accountable for this change in perspective on the role of practice in academic research. In the humanities, ‘practice’ has long been, and often still is, regarded as subordinate and subservient to theory. Many scholars look down on practice as being merely the handwork in the laboratory that is needed to support or provide proof of theory. The truly important work is of a theoretical nature, that is, the work of the mind. The hegemony of theory largely explains the struggle of art academies in Europe to gain recognition for <mark class="c5">artistic research</mark> by universities (see <mark class="c5">artistic research</mark>).</div>

	From a historical point of view, the binary understanding of concept and matter, of subject and object, and the hierarchy of theory over practice in Western culture originated in the age-old tradition of valuing ''vita contemplativa'' over ''vita activa.'' The predominance of mind over body can be traced back to Plato and to Saint Augustine’s embracing of platonic thinking, as argued by Hannah Arendt in ''The Life of the Mind'' (1978). Like Plato, Aristotle held deductive thinking in high esteem and downplayed experiment. Aristotle’s ''Categories'' became formative of and canonical to medieval scholasticism.		From a historical point of view, the binary understanding of concept and matter, of subject and object, and the hierarchy of theory over practice in Western culture originated in the age-old tradition of valuing ''vita contemplativa'' over ''vita activa.'' The predominance of mind over body can be traced back to Plato and to Saint Augustine’s embracing of platonic thinking, as argued by Hannah Arendt in ''The Life of the Mind'' (1978). Like Plato, Aristotle held deductive thinking in high esteem and downplayed experiment. Aristotle’s ''Categories'' became formative of and canonical to medieval scholasticism.

Hd-onions at 17:21, 10 April 2022

2022-04-10T17:21:15Z

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	Conceptual art practices therefore may be, and often are, rooted in materiality and in material processes. This is the reason why many so-called Conceptual artists (such as Lawrence Weiner) refuse to be categorized as such. ‘Conceptual’ here refers not so much to the ‘art work as idea’ but to art practices in which the process of art making is regarded as equally important or relevant as the eventual outcome of this process (Cf Weiner: ‘the piece need not be built’)<ref>From Weiner’s ‘Statements’: 1) The artist may construct the piece 2) The piece may be fabricated <br>3) The piece need not be built. The Statements were published in 1968 by Seth Siegelaub as artist book.</ref>. There is no hierarchy here of ‘materiality’ and ‘conceptuality’, and no hierarchy of theory and experiment. In conceptual art (not only referring to American Conceptual Art form the 1960s and 1970s, but in the broader sense of the word), the role and importance of critical reflection in the making		Conceptual art practices therefore may be, and often are, rooted in materiality and in material processes. This is the reason why many so-called Conceptual artists (such as Lawrence Weiner) refuse to be categorized as such. ‘Conceptual’ here refers not so much to the ‘art work as idea’ but to art practices in which the process of art making is regarded as equally important or relevant as the eventual outcome of this process (Cf Weiner: ‘the piece need not be built’)<ref>From Weiner’s ‘Statements’: 1) The artist may construct the piece 2) The piece may be fabricated <br>3) The piece need not be built. The Statements were published in 1968 by Seth Siegelaub as artist book.</ref>. There is no hierarchy here of ‘materiality’ and ‘conceptuality’, and no hierarchy of theory and experiment. In conceptual art (not only referring to American Conceptual Art form the 1960s and 1970s, but in the broader sense of the word), the role and importance of critical reflection in the making
	process, and of theory in the physical experiment, is acknowledged. One might even argue that nowadays, under the ‘postconceptual condition’ (Peter Osborne), the conceptual nature of art practice is recognized as a ''sine qua non''. Art practice is of a material as well as a conceptual nature at the same time. One might conclude that the traditional philosophical opposition of matter and concept, of practice and theory, is overcome or nullified here.		process, and of theory in the physical experiment, is acknowledged. One might even argue that nowadays, under the ‘postconceptual condition’ (Peter Osborne), the conceptual nature of art practice is recognized <br>
			as a ''sine qua non''. Art practice is of a material as well as a conceptual nature at the same time. One might conclude that the traditional philosophical opposition of matter and concept, of practice and theory, is overcome or nullified here.

	Examples in this book of the reciprocal entanglement of concept and matter are Femke Snelting’s project at the Bidston Observatory in Liverpool (see Snelting on <mark class="c1">embeddednes</mark>); Thalia Hoffman’s performance ''To Serve You'' (in <mark class="c6">feeding</mark>); or Kate Rich on <mark class="c4">business</mark> (in fact, this book contains many more examples).		Examples in this book of the reciprocal entanglement of concept and matter are Femke Snelting’s project at the Bidston Observatory in Liverpool (see Snelting on <mark class="c1">embeddednes</mark>); Thalia Hoffman’s performance ''To Serve You'' (in <mark class="c6">feeding</mark>); <br>
			or Kate Rich on <mark class="c4">business</mark> (in fact, this book contains many more examples).

Hd-onions at 17:16, 10 April 2022

2022-04-10T17:16:18Z

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	For Hacking, practice is characterized by experiment and by the intervention in reality (instead of the <mark class="c3">representation</mark> of reality). Hacking calls himself an ‘ontological realist’ who believes the entities, states and processes described by correct theories are real, and not mere ‘constructs of the human mind for organizing our experiments’.<ref>Ibid., p. 2.</ref> In a certain respect, Hacking’s ''Representing and Intervening'' anticipates New Materialist modes of thinking.<ref>The New Materialist strain of thinking goes by a number of different names, among which New Materialism, Object Oriented Ontology, and Speculative Realism.</ref> Under the heading of New Materialism, a diverse group of thinkers is brought together who, despite differences in outlook, agree in one fundamental respect: the existence of a reality, or of a world, of objects ''out there'', independent of our gaze and of our knowledge of them, independent also of our access to these objects.		For Hacking, practice is characterized by experiment and by the intervention in reality (instead of the <mark class="c3">representation</mark> of reality). Hacking calls himself an ‘ontological realist’ who believes the entities, states and processes described by correct theories are real, and not mere ‘constructs of the human mind for organizing our experiments’.<ref>Ibid., p. 2.</ref> In a certain respect, Hacking’s ''Representing and Intervening'' anticipates New Materialist modes of thinking.<ref>The New Materialist strain of thinking goes by a number of different names, among which New Materialism, Object Oriented Ontology, and Speculative Realism.</ref> Under the heading of New Materialism, a diverse group of thinkers is brought together who, despite differences in outlook, agree in one fundamental respect: the existence of a reality, or of a world, of objects ''out there'', independent of our gaze and of our knowledge of them, independent also of our access to these objects.

			<br>

	These thinkers aim ‘to preserve the autonomy and irreducibility of substance’.<ref>Levi R. Bryant, ''The Democracy of Objects'' (Ann Arbor: Open Humanities Press, 2011), p. 26.</ref>		These thinkers aim ‘to preserve the autonomy and irreducibility of substance’.<ref>Levi R. Bryant, ''The Democracy of Objects'' (Ann Arbor: Open Humanities Press, 2011), p. 26.</ref>

Hd-onions at 17:15, 10 April 2022

2022-04-10T17:15:08Z

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	<span class="author">Janneke Wesseling</span>		<span class="author">Janneke Wesseling</span>

	Over the past decades, a re-evaluation or even rehabilitation of practice in relation to theory can be witnessed in the field of the humanities. New Materialist modes of thinking are largely accountable for this change in perspective on the role of practice in academic research. In the humanities, ‘practice’ has long been, and often still is, regarded as subordinate and subservient to theory. Many scholars look down on practice as being merely the handwork in the laboratory that is needed to support or provide proof of theory. The truly important work is of a theoretical nature, that is, the work of the mind. The hegemony ~~<br>~~		Over the past decades, a re-evaluation or even rehabilitation of practice in relation to theory can be witnessed in the field of the humanities. New Materialist modes of thinking are largely accountable for this change in perspective on the role of practice in academic research. In the humanities, ‘practice’ has long been, and often still is, regarded as subordinate and subservient to theory. Many scholars look down on practice as being merely the handwork in the laboratory that is needed to support or provide proof of theory. The truly important work is of a theoretical nature, that is, the work of the mind. The hegemony of theory largely explains the struggle of art academies in Europe to gain recognition for <mark class="c5">artistic research</mark> by universities (see <mark class="c5">artistic research</mark>).
	of theory largely explains the struggle of art academies in Europe to gain recognition for <mark class="c5">artistic research</mark> ~~<br>~~
	by universities (see <mark class="c5">artistic research</mark>).

	From a historical point of view, the binary understanding of concept and matter, of subject and object, and the hierarchy of theory over practice in Western culture originated in the age-old tradition of valuing ''vita contemplativa'' over ''vita activa.'' The predominance of mind over body can be traced back to Plato and to Saint Augustine’s embracing of platonic thinking, as argued by Hannah Arendt in ''The Life of the Mind'' (1978). Like Plato, Aristotle held deductive thinking in high esteem and downplayed experiment. Aristotle’s ''Categories'' became formative of and canonical to medieval scholasticism.		From a historical point of view, the binary understanding of concept and matter, of subject and object, and the hierarchy of theory over practice in Western culture originated in the age-old tradition of valuing ''vita contemplativa'' over ''vita activa.'' The predominance of mind over body can be traced back to Plato and to Saint Augustine’s embracing of platonic thinking, as argued by Hannah Arendt in ''The Life of the Mind'' (1978). Like Plato, Aristotle held deductive thinking in high esteem and downplayed experiment. Aristotle’s ''Categories'' became formative of and canonical to medieval scholasticism.
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	According to American philosopher Ian Hacking (''Representing and Intervening'', 1983), the imbalance of theory and experiment was reversed with the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, in particular with the thinking of Francis Bacon (1561–1626). During the scientific revolution, practical experiment ‘was officially declared to be the royal road to knowledge, and the schoolmen were scorned because they argued from books instead of observing the world around them’.<ref>Ian Hacking, ''Representing and Intervening Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science'' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 149.</ref> But times have changed, Hacking tells us, and today the history of the sciences is almost always written as a history of theory rather than of experiment: philosophers of science ‘constantly discuss theories and <mark class="c3">representations</mark> of reality, but say almost nothing about experiment, technology, or the use of knowledge to alter the world’. Hacking also notes that the theory/experiment status difference is ‘modelled on social rank’. His ''Representing and Intervening'' contests the theory-dominated history of science. It is Hacking’s conviction that ‘a question posed in terms of theory and experiment is misleading because it treats theory as one rather uniform kind of thing and experiment as another’.<ref>Ibid., p. 162.</ref>		According to American philosopher Ian Hacking (''Representing and Intervening'', 1983), the imbalance of theory and experiment was reversed with the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, in particular with the thinking of Francis Bacon (1561–1626). During the scientific revolution, practical experiment ‘was officially declared to be the royal road to knowledge, and the schoolmen were scorned because they argued from books instead of observing the world around them’.<ref>Ian Hacking, ''Representing and Intervening Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science'' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 149.</ref> But times have changed, Hacking tells us, and today the history of the sciences is almost always written as a history of theory rather than of experiment: philosophers of science ‘constantly discuss theories and <mark class="c3">representations</mark> of reality, but say almost nothing about experiment, technology, or the use of knowledge to alter the world’. Hacking also notes that the theory/experiment status difference is ‘modelled on social rank’. His ''Representing and Intervening'' contests the theory-dominated history of science. It is Hacking’s conviction that ‘a question posed in terms of theory and experiment is misleading because it treats theory as one rather uniform kind of thing and experiment as another’.<ref>Ibid., p. 162.</ref>

	For Hacking, practice is characterized by experiment and by the intervention in reality (instead of the <mark class="c3">representation</mark> of reality). Hacking calls himself an ‘ontological realist’ who believes the entities, states and processes described by correct theories are real, and not mere ‘constructs of the human mind for organizing our experiments’.<ref>Ibid., p. 2.</ref> In a certain respect, Hacking’s ''Representing and Intervening'' anticipates New Materialist modes of thinking.<ref>The New Materialist strain of thinking goes ~~<br>~~		For Hacking, practice is characterized by experiment and by the intervention in reality (instead of the <mark class="c3">representation</mark> of reality). Hacking calls himself an ‘ontological realist’ who believes the entities, states and processes described by correct theories are real, and not mere ‘constructs of the human mind for organizing our experiments’.<ref>Ibid., p. 2.</ref> In a certain respect, Hacking’s ''Representing and Intervening'' anticipates New Materialist modes of thinking.<ref>The New Materialist strain of thinking goes by a number of different names, among which New Materialism, Object Oriented Ontology, and Speculative Realism.</ref> Under the heading of New Materialism, a diverse group of thinkers is brought together who, despite differences in outlook, agree in one fundamental respect: the existence of a reality, or of a world, of objects ''out there'', independent of our gaze and of our knowledge of them, independent also of our access to these objects.
	by a number of different names, among which ~~<br>~~
	New Materialism, Object Oriented Ontology, ~~<br>~~
	and Speculative Realism.</ref> Under the heading of New Materialism, a diverse group of thinkers is brought together who, despite differences in outlook, agree in one fundamental respect: the existence of a reality, or of a world, of objects ''out there'', independent of our gaze and of our knowledge of them, independent also of our access to these objects.

	These thinkers aim ‘to preserve the autonomy and irreducibility of substance’.<ref>Levi R. Bryant, ''The Democracy of Objects'' ~~<br>~~(Ann Arbor: Open Humanities Press, 2011), p. 26.</ref>		These thinkers aim ‘to preserve the autonomy and irreducibility of substance’.<ref>Levi R. Bryant, ''The Democracy of Objects'' (Ann Arbor: Open Humanities Press, 2011), p. 26.</ref>

	New Materialism embodies the attempt to sidestep the subject-object divide created by René Descartes and Enlightenment philosophers such as Hume and Kant. New Materialists aim to overcome the Cartesian worldview, that is, the subject-object distinction.		New Materialism embodies the attempt to sidestep the subject-object divide created by René Descartes and Enlightenment philosophers such as Hume and Kant. New Materialists aim to overcome the Cartesian worldview, that is, the subject-object distinction.
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	It is not the scope of this text to offer an interpretation of Barad’s thinking. What is important here is that Barad does not refer to matter as a fixed substance, but rather as a process of ‘iterative intra-activity’. ‘Matter’, in her view, ‘refers to phenomena in their ongoing materialization’.<ref>Ibid., p. 151.</ref>		It is not the scope of this text to offer an interpretation of Barad’s thinking. What is important here is that Barad does not refer to matter as a fixed substance, but rather as a process of ‘iterative intra-activity’. ‘Matter’, in her view, ‘refers to phenomena in their ongoing materialization’.<ref>Ibid., p. 151.</ref>

	Now, how might this New Materialist account relate to what is generally understood as ''material practice'' in the discourse among artists? It must be noted that in artistic discourse material practice is not used in opposition to ‘conceptual practice’. Put otherwise, ~~<br>~~		Now, how might this New Materialist account relate to what is generally understood as ''material practice'' in the discourse among artists? It must be noted that in artistic discourse material practice is not used in opposition to ‘conceptual practice’. Put otherwise, in artistic discourse, a practice that takes physical material or materiality as point of departure is not necessarily opposed to a practice that is guided by an abstract idea. For artists, material practice and ‘conceptual practice’ are multi-layered terms that do not exclude one another. More than that, from the 1960s onward, conceptual artists sought to connect or entangle matter and idea, image and language, thematizing this connection through their work.<ref>An early case in point are the ''Industrial Poems'', or plastic ‘Plaques’, produced by Marcel Broodthaers, 1968–1972. Broodthaers said of these plaques that they were a kind of rebuses, of which ‘the reading is impeded by the image-like quality of the text and vice versa. The stereotypical character of both text and image is defined by the technique of plastic. They are intended to be read on a double level—each one involved in a negative attitude which seems to me specific to the stance of the artist: not to place the message completely on one side alone, neither image nor text.’ In: ‘Dix mille francs de récompense’ (1974), reprinted in ''Industrial Poems Marcel Broodthaers: The Complete Catalogue of the Plaques, 1968–1972'', ed. Charlotte Friling and Dirk Snauwaert (Brussels: WIELS; Berlin: Hatje Cantz, 2021), p. 9.</ref>
	in artistic discourse, a practice that takes physical material or materiality as point of departure is not necessarily opposed to a practice that is guided by an abstract idea. For artists, material practice and ‘conceptual practice’ are multi-layered terms that do not exclude one another. More than that, from the 1960s onward, conceptual artists sought to connect ~~<br>~~
	or entangle matter and idea, image and language, thematizing this connection through their work.<ref>An early case in point are the ''Industrial Poems'', or plastic ‘Plaques’, produced by Marcel Broodthaers, 1968–1972. Broodthaers said of these plaques that they were a kind of rebuses, of which ‘the reading is impeded by the image-like quality of the text and vice versa. The stereotypical character of both text and image is defined by the technique of plastic. They are intended to be read on a double level—each one involved in a negative attitude which seems to me specific to the stance of the artist: not to place the message completely on one side alone, neither image nor text.’ In: ‘Dix mille francs de récompense’ (1974), reprinted in ''Industrial Poems Marcel Broodthaers: The Complete Catalogue of the Plaques, 1968–1972'', ed. Charlotte Friling and Dirk Snauwaert (Brussels: WIELS; Berlin: Hatje Cantz, 2021), p. 9.</ref>

	Conceptual art practices therefore may be, and often are, rooted in materiality and in material processes. This is the reason why many so-called Conceptual artists (such as Lawrence Weiner) refuse ~~<br>~~		Conceptual art practices therefore may be, and often are, rooted in materiality and in material processes. This is the reason why many so-called Conceptual artists (such as Lawrence Weiner) refuse to be categorized as such. ‘Conceptual’ here refers not so much to the ‘art work as idea’ but to art practices in which the process of art making is regarded as equally important or relevant as the eventual outcome of this process (Cf Weiner: ‘the piece need not be built’)<ref>From Weiner’s ‘Statements’: 1) The artist may construct the piece 2) The piece may be fabricated <br>3) The piece need not be built. The Statements were published in 1968 by Seth Siegelaub as artist book.</ref>. There is no hierarchy here of ‘materiality’ and ‘conceptuality’, and no hierarchy of theory and experiment. In conceptual art (not only referring to American Conceptual Art form the 1960s and 1970s, but in the broader sense of the word), the role and importance of critical reflection in the making
	to be categorized as such. ‘Conceptual’ here refers not so much to the ‘art work as idea’ but to art practices in which the process of art making is regarded as equally important or relevant as the eventual outcome of this process (Cf Weiner: ‘the piece need not be built’)<ref>From Weiner’s ‘Statements’: 1) The artist may construct the piece 2) The piece may be fabricated <br>3) The piece need not be built. The Statements were published in 1968 by Seth Siegelaub as artist book.</ref>. There is no hierarchy here of ‘materiality’ ~~<br>~~		process, and of theory in the physical experiment, is acknowledged. One might even argue that nowadays, under the ‘postconceptual condition’ (Peter Osborne), the conceptual nature of art practice is recognized as a ''sine qua non''. Art practice is of a material as well as a conceptual nature at the same time. One might conclude that the traditional philosophical opposition of matter and concept, of practice and theory, is overcome or nullified here.
	and ‘conceptuality’, and no hierarchy of theory and experiment. In conceptual art (not only referring to American Conceptual Art form the 1960s and 1970s, but in the broader sense of the word), the role and importance of critical reflection in the making ~~<br>~~
	process, and of theory in the physical experiment, is acknowledged. One might even argue that nowadays, under the ‘postconceptual condition’ (Peter Osborne), the conceptual nature of art practice is recognized ~~<br>~~ as a ''sine qua non''. Art practice is of a material as well as a conceptual nature at the same time. One might conclude that the traditional philosophical opposition of matter and concept, of practice and theory, is overcome or nullified here.

	Examples in this book of the reciprocal entanglement of concept and matter are Femke Snelting’s project at the Bidston Observatory in Liverpool (see Snelting on <mark class="c1">embeddednes</mark>); Thalia Hoffman’s performance ''To Serve You'' (in <mark class="c6">feeding</mark>); ~~<br>~~		Examples in this book of the reciprocal entanglement of concept and matter are Femke Snelting’s project at the Bidston Observatory in Liverpool (see Snelting on <mark class="c1">embeddednes</mark>); Thalia Hoffman’s performance ''To Serve You'' (in <mark class="c6">feeding</mark>); or Kate Rich on <mark class="c4">business</mark> (in fact, this book contains many more examples).
	or Kate Rich on <mark class="c4">business</mark> (in fact, this book contains many more examples).

Hd-onions at 17:11, 10 April 2022

2022-04-10T17:11:48Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 19:11, 10 April 2022
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	From a historical point of view, the binary understanding of concept and matter, of subject and object, and the hierarchy of theory over practice in Western culture originated in the age-old tradition of valuing ''vita contemplativa'' over ''vita activa.'' The predominance of mind over body can be traced back to Plato and to Saint Augustine’s embracing of platonic thinking, as argued by Hannah Arendt in ''The Life of the Mind'' (1978). Like Plato, Aristotle held deductive thinking in high esteem and downplayed experiment. Aristotle’s ''Categories'' became formative of and canonical to medieval scholasticism.		From a historical point of view, the binary understanding of concept and matter, of subject and object, and the hierarchy of theory over practice in Western culture originated in the age-old tradition of valuing ''vita contemplativa'' over ''vita activa.'' The predominance of mind over body can be traced back to Plato and to Saint Augustine’s embracing of platonic thinking, as argued by Hannah Arendt in ''The Life of the Mind'' (1978). Like Plato, Aristotle held deductive thinking in high esteem and downplayed experiment. Aristotle’s ''Categories'' became formative of and canonical to medieval scholasticism.

	According to American philosopher Ian Hacking (''Representing and Intervening'', 1983), the imbalance of theory and experiment was reversed with the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, in particular with the thinking of Francis Bacon (1561–1626). During the scientific revolution, practical experiment ‘was officially declared to be the royal road to knowledge, and the schoolmen were scorned because they argued from books instead of observing the world around them’.<ref>Ian Hacking, ''Representing and Intervening Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science'' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 149.</ref> But times have changed, Hacking tells us, ~~<br>~~		According to American philosopher Ian Hacking (''Representing and Intervening'', 1983), the imbalance of theory and experiment was reversed with the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, in particular with the thinking of Francis Bacon (1561–1626). During the scientific revolution, practical experiment ‘was officially declared to be the royal road to knowledge, and the schoolmen were scorned because they argued from books instead of observing the world around them’.<ref>Ian Hacking, ''Representing and Intervening Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science'' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 149.</ref> But times have changed, Hacking tells us, and today the history of the sciences is almost always written as a history of theory rather than of experiment: philosophers of science ‘constantly discuss theories and <mark class="c3">representations</mark> of reality, but say almost nothing about experiment, technology, or the use of knowledge to alter the world’. Hacking also notes that the theory/experiment status difference is ‘modelled on social rank’. His ''Representing and Intervening'' contests the theory-dominated history of science. It is Hacking’s conviction that ‘a question posed in terms of theory and experiment is misleading because it treats theory as one rather uniform kind of thing and experiment as another’.<ref>Ibid., p. 162.</ref>
	and today the history of the sciences is almost always written as a history of theory rather than of experiment: philosophers of science ‘constantly discuss theories and <mark class="c3">representations</mark> of reality, but say almost nothing about experiment, technology, or the use of knowledge to alter the world’. Hacking also notes that the theory/experiment status difference is ‘modelled on social rank’. His ''Representing and Intervening'' contests the theory-dominated history of science. It is Hacking’s conviction that ‘a question posed in terms of theory and experiment is misleading because it treats theory as one rather uniform kind of thing and experiment as another’.<ref>Ibid., p. 162.</ref>

	For Hacking, practice is characterized by experiment and by the intervention in reality (instead of the <mark class="c3">representation</mark> of reality). Hacking calls himself an ‘ontological realist’ who believes the entities, states and processes described by correct theories are real, and not mere ‘constructs of the human mind for organizing our experiments’.<ref>Ibid., p. 2.</ref> In a certain respect, Hacking’s ''Representing and Intervening'' anticipates New Materialist modes of thinking.<ref>The New Materialist strain of thinking goes <br>		For Hacking, practice is characterized by experiment and by the intervention in reality (instead of the <mark class="c3">representation</mark> of reality). Hacking calls himself an ‘ontological realist’ who believes the entities, states and processes described by correct theories are real, and not mere ‘constructs of the human mind for organizing our experiments’.<ref>Ibid., p. 2.</ref> In a certain respect, Hacking’s ''Representing and Intervening'' anticipates New Materialist modes of thinking.<ref>The New Materialist strain of thinking goes <br>
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	Now, how might this New Materialist account relate to what is generally understood as ''material practice'' in the discourse among artists? It must be noted that in artistic discourse material practice is not used in opposition to ‘conceptual practice’. Put otherwise, <br>		Now, how might this New Materialist account relate to what is generally understood as ''material practice'' in the discourse among artists? It must be noted that in artistic discourse material practice is not used in opposition to ‘conceptual practice’. Put otherwise, <br>
	in artistic discourse, a practice that takes physical material or materiality as point of departure is not necessarily opposed to a practice that is guided by an abstract idea. For artists, material practice and ‘conceptual practice’ are multi-layered terms that do not exclude one another. More than that, from the 1960s onward, conceptual artists sought to connect <br>		in artistic discourse, a practice that takes physical material or materiality as point of departure is not necessarily opposed to a practice that is guided by an abstract idea. For artists, material practice and ‘conceptual practice’ are multi-layered terms that do not exclude one another. More than that, from the 1960s onward, conceptual artists sought to connect <br>
	or entangle matter and idea, image and language, thematizing this connection through their work.<ref>An early case in point are the ''Industrial Poems'', ~~<br>~~		or entangle matter and idea, image and language, thematizing this connection through their work.<ref>An early case in point are the ''Industrial Poems'', or plastic ‘Plaques’, produced by Marcel Broodthaers, 1968–1972. Broodthaers said of these plaques that they were a kind of rebuses, of which ‘the reading is impeded by the image-like quality of the text and vice versa. The stereotypical character of both text and image is defined by the technique of plastic. They are intended to be read on a double level—each one involved in a negative attitude which seems to me specific to the stance of the artist: not to place the message completely on one side alone, neither image nor text.’ In: ‘Dix mille francs de récompense’ (1974), reprinted in ''Industrial Poems Marcel Broodthaers: The Complete Catalogue of the Plaques, 1968–1972'', ed. Charlotte Friling and Dirk Snauwaert (Brussels: WIELS; Berlin: Hatje Cantz, 2021), p. 9.</ref>
	or plastic ‘Plaques’, produced by Marcel Broodthaers, 1968–1972. Broodthaers said of these plaques that they were a kind of rebuses, of which ‘the reading is impeded by the image-like quality of the text and vice versa. ~~<br>~~
	The stereotypical character of both text and image is defined by the technique of plastic. They are intended to be read on a double level—each one involved in a negative attitude which seems to me specific to the stance of the artist: not to place the message completely on one side alone, neither image nor text.’ In: ‘Dix mille francs de récompense’ (1974), reprinted ~~<br>~~
	in ''Industrial Poems Marcel Broodthaers: The Complete Catalogue of the Plaques, 1968–1972'', ed. Charlotte Friling and Dirk Snauwaert (Brussels: WIELS; Berlin: Hatje Cantz, 2021), p. 9.</ref>

	Conceptual art practices therefore may be, and often are, rooted in materiality and in material processes. This is the reason why many so-called Conceptual artists (such as Lawrence Weiner) refuse <br>		Conceptual art practices therefore may be, and often are, rooted in materiality and in material processes. This is the reason why many so-called Conceptual artists (such as Lawrence Weiner) refuse <br>

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	According to American philosopher Ian Hacking (''Representing and Intervening'', 1983), the imbalance of theory and experiment was reversed with the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, in particular with the thinking of Francis Bacon (1561–1626). During the scientific revolution, practical experiment ‘was officially declared to be the royal road to knowledge, and the schoolmen were scorned because they argued from books instead of observing the world around them’.<ref>Ian Hacking, ''Representing and Intervening Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science'' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 149.</ref> But times have changed, Hacking tells us, <br>		According to American philosopher Ian Hacking (''Representing and Intervening'', 1983), the imbalance of theory and experiment was reversed with the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, in particular with the thinking of Francis Bacon (1561–1626). During the scientific revolution, practical experiment ‘was officially declared to be the royal road to knowledge, and the schoolmen were scorned because they argued from books instead of observing the world around them’.<ref>Ian Hacking, ''Representing and Intervening Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science'' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 149.</ref> But times have changed, Hacking tells us, <br>
	and today the history of the sciences is almost always written as a history of theory rather than of experiment: philosophers of science ‘constantly discuss theories and <mark class="c3">representations</mark> of reality, but say almost nothing about experiment, technology, or the use of knowledge to alter the world’. Hacking also notes that the theory/experiment status difference is ‘modelled on social rank’. His ''Representing and Intervening'' contests the theory-dominated history of science. It is Hacking’s conviction that ‘a question posed in terms of theory and experiment is misleading because it treats theory as one rather uniform kind of thing and experiment as another’.<ref>Ibid., p. 162.</ref>		and today the history of the sciences is almost always written as a history of theory rather than of experiment: philosophers of science ‘constantly discuss theories and <mark class="c3">representations</mark> of reality, but say almost nothing about experiment, technology, or the use of knowledge to alter the world’. Hacking also notes that the theory/experiment status difference is ‘modelled on social rank’. His ''Representing and Intervening'' contests the theory-dominated history of science. It is Hacking’s conviction that ‘a question posed in terms of theory and experiment is misleading because it treats theory as one rather uniform kind of thing and experiment as another’.<ref>Ibid., p. 162.</ref>

	For Hacking, practice is characterized by experiment and by the intervention in reality (instead of the <mark class="c3">representation</mark> of reality). Hacking calls himself an ‘ontological realist’ who believes the entities, states and processes described by correct theories are real, and not mere ‘constructs of the human mind for organizing our experiments’.<ref>Ibid., p. 2.</ref> In a certain respect, Hacking’s ''Representing and Intervening'' anticipates New Materialist modes of thinking.<ref>The New Materialist strain of thinking goes <br>		For Hacking, practice is characterized by experiment and by the intervention in reality (instead of the <mark class="c3">representation</mark> of reality). Hacking calls himself an ‘ontological realist’ who believes the entities, states and processes described by correct theories are real, and not mere ‘constructs of the human mind for organizing our experiments’.<ref>Ibid., p. 2.</ref> In a certain respect, Hacking’s ''Representing and Intervening'' anticipates New Materialist modes of thinking.<ref>The New Materialist strain of thinking goes <br>
	by a number of different names, among which <br>		by a number of different names, among which <br>

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	According to American philosopher Ian Hacking (''Representing and Intervening'', 1983), the imbalance of theory and experiment was reversed with the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, in particular with the thinking of Francis Bacon (1561–1626). During the scientific revolution, practical experiment ‘was officially declared to be the royal road to knowledge, and the schoolmen were scorned because they argued from books instead of observing the world around them’.<ref>Ian Hacking, ''Representing and Intervening Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science'' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 149.</ref> But times have changed, Hacking tells us, <br>		According to American philosopher Ian Hacking (''Representing and Intervening'', 1983), the imbalance of theory and experiment was reversed with the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, in particular with the thinking of Francis Bacon (1561–1626). During the scientific revolution, practical experiment ‘was officially declared to be the royal road to knowledge, and the schoolmen were scorned because they argued from books instead of observing the world around them’.<ref>Ian Hacking, ''Representing and Intervening Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science'' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 149.</ref> But times have changed, Hacking tells us, <br>
	and today the history of the sciences is almost always written as a history of theory rather than of experiment: philosophers of science ‘constantly discuss theories and <mark class="c3">representations</mark> of reality, but say almost nothing about experiment, technology, or the use of knowledge to alter the world’. Hacking also notes that the theory/experiment status difference is ‘modelled on social rank’. His ''Representing and Intervening'' contests the theory-dominated history of science. It is Hacking’s conviction that ‘a question posed in terms of theory and experiment is misleading because it treats theory as one rather uniform kind of thing and experiment as another’.<ref>Ibid., p. 162.</ref>		and today the history of the sciences is almost always written as a history of theory rather than of experiment: philosophers of science ‘constantly discuss theories and <mark class="c3">representations</mark> of reality, but say almost nothing about experiment, technology, or the use of knowledge to alter the world’. Hacking also notes that the theory/experiment status difference is ‘modelled on social rank’. His ''Representing and Intervening'' contests the theory-dominated history of science. It is Hacking’s conviction that ‘a question posed in terms of theory and experiment is misleading because it treats theory as one rather uniform kind of thing and experiment as another’.<ref>Ibid., p. 162.</ref>

	For Hacking, practice is characterized by experiment and by the intervention in reality (instead of the <mark class="c3">representation</mark> of reality). Hacking calls himself an ‘ontological realist’ who believes the entities, states and processes described by correct theories are real, and not mere ‘constructs of the human mind for organizing our experiments’.<ref>Ibid., p. 2.</ref> In a certain respect, Hacking’s ''Representing and Intervening'' anticipates New Materialist modes of thinking.<ref>The New Materialist strain of thinking goes <br>		For Hacking, practice is characterized by experiment and by the intervention in reality (instead of the <mark class="c3">representation</mark> of reality). Hacking calls himself an ‘ontological realist’ who believes the entities, states and processes described by correct theories are real, and not mere ‘constructs of the human mind for organizing our experiments’.<ref>Ibid., p. 2.</ref> In a certain respect, Hacking’s ''Representing and Intervening'' anticipates New Materialist modes of thinking.<ref>The New Materialist strain of thinking goes <br>
	by a number of different names, among which <br>		by a number of different names, among which <br>

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	According to American philosopher Ian Hacking (''Representing and Intervening'', 1983), the imbalance of theory and experiment was reversed with the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, in particular with the thinking of Francis Bacon (1561–1626). During the scientific revolution, practical experiment ‘was officially declared to be the royal road to knowledge, and the schoolmen were scorned because they argued from books instead of observing the world around them’.<ref>Ian Hacking, ''Representing and Intervening Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science'' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 149.</ref> But times have changed, Hacking tells us, <br>		According to American philosopher Ian Hacking (''Representing and Intervening'', 1983), the imbalance of theory and experiment was reversed with the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, in particular with the thinking of Francis Bacon (1561–1626). During the scientific revolution, practical experiment ‘was officially declared to be the royal road to knowledge, and the schoolmen were scorned because they argued from books instead of observing the world around them’.<ref>Ian Hacking, ''Representing and Intervening Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science'' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 149.</ref> But times have changed, Hacking tells us, <br>
	and today the history of the sciences is almost always written as a history of theory rather than of experiment: philosophers of science ‘constantly discuss theories and <mark class="c3">representations</mark> of reality, but say almost nothing about experiment, technology, or the use of knowledge to alter the world’. Hacking also notes that the theory/experiment status difference is ‘modelled on social rank’. His ''Representing and Intervening'' contests the theory-dominated history ~~<br>~~		and today the history of the sciences is almost always written as a history of theory rather than of experiment: philosophers of science ‘constantly discuss theories and <mark class="c3">representations</mark> of reality, but say almost nothing about experiment, technology, or the use of knowledge to alter the world’. Hacking also notes that the theory/experiment status difference is ‘modelled on social rank’. His ''Representing and Intervening'' contests the theory-dominated history of science. It is Hacking’s conviction that ‘a question posed in terms of theory and experiment is misleading because it treats theory as one rather uniform kind of thing and experiment as another’.<ref>Ibid., p. 162.</ref>
	of science. It is Hacking’s conviction that ‘a question posed in terms of theory and experiment is misleading because it treats theory as one rather uniform kind of thing and experiment as another’.<ref>Ibid., p. 162.</ref>

	For Hacking, practice is characterized by experiment and by the intervention in reality (instead of the <mark class="c3">representation</mark> of reality). Hacking calls himself an ‘ontological realist’ who believes the entities, states and processes described by correct theories are real, and not mere ‘constructs of the human mind for organizing our experiments’.<ref>Ibid., p. 2.</ref> In a certain respect, Hacking’s ''Representing and Intervening'' anticipates New Materialist modes of thinking.<ref>The New Materialist strain of thinking goes <br>		For Hacking, practice is characterized by experiment and by the intervention in reality (instead of the <mark class="c3">representation</mark> of reality). Hacking calls himself an ‘ontological realist’ who believes the entities, states and processes described by correct theories are real, and not mere ‘constructs of the human mind for organizing our experiments’.<ref>Ibid., p. 2.</ref> In a certain respect, Hacking’s ''Representing and Intervening'' anticipates New Materialist modes of thinking.<ref>The New Materialist strain of thinking goes <br>

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	New Materialism, Object Oriented Ontology, <br>		New Materialism, Object Oriented Ontology, <br>
	and Speculative Realism.</ref> Under the heading of New Materialism, a diverse group of thinkers is brought together who, despite differences in outlook, agree in one fundamental respect: the existence of a reality, or of a world, of objects ''out there'', independent of our gaze and of our knowledge of them, independent also of our access to these objects.		and Speculative Realism.</ref> Under the heading of New Materialism, a diverse group of thinkers is brought together who, despite differences in outlook, agree in one fundamental respect: the existence of a reality, or of a world, of objects ''out there'', independent of our gaze and of our knowledge of them, independent also of our access to these objects.

	~~<span class="page-break"> </span>~~

	These thinkers aim ‘to preserve the autonomy and irreducibility of substance’.<ref>Levi R. Bryant, ''The Democracy of Objects'' <br>(Ann Arbor: Open Humanities Press, 2011), p. 26.</ref>		These thinkers aim ‘to preserve the autonomy and irreducibility of substance’.<ref>Levi R. Bryant, ''The Democracy of Objects'' <br>(Ann Arbor: Open Humanities Press, 2011), p. 26.</ref>